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COMPUANCE AND ENFORCEMENT:
AVIATION SAFETY IN THE PUBUC SECTOR
PART III: An Alternative Enforcement Program
Laurence E. Gesell. Ph.D.• and Robert Anderson
ABSTRACT
This is the final anicle of 8 three pan series looking at sanctions imposed upon airmen for
non-compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations. In pan I the Federal Aviation Administration's statutory
authority and enforcementprocedures were addressed. pan II looked at the current enforcementprogram
andpresented an overview ofadministrative and legal enforcementactions. pan IIIproposes an alternative,
restitutive enforcementprogram which mightprovide for a more street level, less centralized form ofjustice.
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Aviation Admini-
stration (FAA) has developed a
Compliance and Enforcement
Program (FAA. 1988a) to fulfill its
statutory oversight obligations.
However. the current enforce-
ment program. fundamentally
retributive in effect. fails to
consider the necessity for. and
benefits of. more restitutive
remedies.
Contained in Part II of this
continuing series was an exam-
ination and analysis of the exist-
ing conflicts between stated
enforcement policy objectives.
contrasted with the effectiveness
of the actual program. Ultimately.
to reconcile the incongruities
discovered. presented in Part III
is a proposal for an alternative
enforcement program described
as Administrative Recision of
Privileges (AROP).
It is well settled that the FAA
has the authority and respon-
sibility to be the predominant
oversight mechanism for aviation
safety in the U.S. In order to
ensure that its regulations and
procedures are followed, the
FAA's compliance and enforce-
ment program asserts that
education, guidance, and under-
standing are the essential
24
elements necessary for success-
ful compliance with its safety
regulations. Moreover. the pro-
gram further declares that volun-
tary compliance (with regUla-
tions) is integral to aviation
safety and only when this fails
should formal enforcement
action ensue.
As discussed in Part II of this
series formal enforcement action
can include administrative action
(e.g.• waming letters etc.) and
legal action (e.g.. certificate
suspension/revocation etc.).
While administrative action is
basically a restitutive approach
to the problem. proffering only
mild admonishment, legal action
can be substantially retributive in
nature and effect.
There are various examples of
divergent conceptual philosophy
between judicial and admini-
strative interpretation regarding
the legal basis (apart from tech-
nical qualification) upon which
suspension, via legal enforce-
ment action, of an airman's cer-
tificate can rest. The judicial
interpretation. however. is the
standard upon which the ulti-
mate and effective reality
surfaces. That is, suspension of
an airman's certificate can be
effected for disciplinary purposes
only to the extent that it acts as
a deterrent to future violations to
the involved violator or those of a
comparable position. Discipline
administered solely for the
purpose of punishment is con-
trary to the punitive limitations
established by legal precedent
and isfundamentally inconsistent
with authoritative agency policy.
CAUSE AND EFFECT
Clearly, the FAA has an obli-
gation to carry out its enforce-
ment goals and objectives
through a program of considered
response consistent with the
cause of the violation and not
just the effect. In addressing only
the effect of an act of non-
compliance. the response goes
directly to the results of the
violation. exclusively furthering
the goals of retribution. However,
if focus were shifted to the cause
of the violation. then redress
could be constructed from
appropriate elements of resti-
tution as well as retribution.
For example, assume that an
errant airman inadvertently
enters a Terminal Control Area
(TCA) without having authori-
zation as required by the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs). In
accordance with the Enforce-
ment Sanction Guidance Table
JAAER, Spring 1992
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in FAA Order 2150.3A, the
appropriate sanction is certificate
suspension for 60 to 90 days. In
selecting a sanction outside of
the 60 to 90 day recommended
range, certain mitigating and
aggravating factors may be
considered. Among these are:
(1) the degree of hazard
created to other aircraft,
persons, or property
(2) whether the violation
was inadvertent or
deliberate
(3) the violation history of
the airman
(4) the violator's level of
experience and attitude
(5) the type of activity. i.e.
public or private, and




In this hypothetical case, if the
moderatelyexperienced airman's
violation was inadvertent and he
or she had a good attitude
without a history of previous
violations, then a suspension for
45 days might be appropriate.
However, if the inadvertent action
of entering the TeA without a
clearance included a significant
hazard to another aircraft, then,
according to the guidance con-
tained in FAA Order 2150.3. a
suspension of 60 days or more
is called for. It could be argued
that if certificate suspension is to
be administered for its deter-
rence value. then the effect of
hazard to another aircraft is
immaterial. The expected value
of future deterrence goes to the
pre-violation mental state of the
airman inVOlved, which is synon-
ymous with cause. and is totally
JAAER, Spring 1992
disassociated with any resulting
hazardous effect that the airman
had no control over.
In addition to the relevance
attached to a resulting hazard as
discussed above. the FAA uses
a similar standard of no
significant unsafe condition
existed as a factor in determin-
ing the applicability of admini-
strative action as opposed to
legal action (rille 14. 1988. Part
13.11). This determinant stan-
dard also considers effect
separate from cause.
Without question. the issue of
effect, even when hazard or lack
of safety is a product of mere
chance, is a central and predom-
inant element utilized in deter-
mining the extent and severity of
a certificate sanction. The
consequence of this retributive
philosophy is a failure to address
and remedy the underlying
cause of the violation.
A viable and more productive
alternative. it would appear. is to
give equal weight to the cause of
a violation. By addressing cause
in addition to effect. the compli-
ance and enforcement program
would embrace a restitutive
solution balanced properly with
needs of retributive deterrence.
A careful analysis of the cause
of violations would reveal funda-
mental elements which need to
be addressed by way of sanc-
tion. If a certain violation was
deliberately made by an experi-
enced airman with a poor atti-
tude and a long history of past
violations, then perhaps a sus-
pension for a significant length of
time would best meet the stand-
ard of deterrence. The pre-
violation mental state of an
airman can sometimes reduce
the perplexing issues surround-
ing cause and effect. If an
airman makes an informed and
deliberate decision which results
in a violation of a safety regula-
tion. then the cause is very
closely associated with the
effect. Under these circum-
stances, a purely retributive
sanction (for deterrence
purposes) void of unnecessary
remedial elements also address-
es restitution in a very conven-
tional way. Specifically, the
violator is deterred from precipi-
tating a similar error in the future.
thereby returning the system (or
victim) to its original state.
Conversely, if a violation
occurs as a result of lack of
knowledge or awareness. then
the sanction approach must be
different. An appropriate sanction
would address a retributive
suspension (for deterrence
purposes) and, at the same time,
remedy the underlying cause.
This should be done through a
mandated program of enhanced
awareness training or a reeduca-
tion process. A balanced pro-
gram of this nature properly
deals with the violation by
utilizing retribution for the effect.
and restitution for the cause.
As previously stated, a clear
and thorough understanding of
the safety regulations is
necessary if compliance is to be
achieved. The understanding of
safety regulations extends to a
working comprehension of the
many complex and frequently
perplexing operational proced-
ures. Education and guidance
are fundamental to achieving
repeated compliance even by
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airmen who are predisposed to
voluntary acceptance of these
safety regulations. In the
absence of relevant. contemp-
orary information. an aviator is a
detriment to self and to other
users of the airspace system.
Ignorance is frequently exposed
through the FAA's enforcement
process and the underlying
cause must be isolated and
addressed.
PROPOSAL
This series has demonstrated
and defined the current enforce-
ment procedures which are utiliz-
ed in dealing with certain actions
found to be in violation of FARs.
It could be argued that the
enforcement tools available and
used by the FAA do not effec-
tively address the shortcoming of
airmen who are in a category
herein defined as under-
informed. The under-informed
airman also suffers from lack of
awareness and generally
commits violations which are not
deliberate and. in fact, are
considered inadvertent. This
category of airman must be the
recipient of a balanced form of
sanction with consideration of
the merits of retribution as well
as restitution. The existing
program does not embrace this
important dimension. A balanced
alternative procedure would
reach the needs of the airman
involved. and. as a result. would
satisfy safety in air commerce
and the public interest.
The program being proposed
would be unchanged through
the investigation data collection
phase. Once evidence was
collected or received by the
Flight Standards District Office
26
(FSDO) the decision for
determining the appropriate
enforcement tool would be
made. If it was determined. by
the FSDO Field Inspectors. that
the involved violation occurred
as a result of an under-informed
action. then selection of the
proposed alternative process
would be initiated. The proposed
program would be known as
Administrative Recision of
Privileges (AROP).
The AROP program would
involve the following procedural
steps:
(1) determination that the
airman met the criteria for
AROP
(2) analysis of the causal
factors precipitating the
violation
(3) selection. by the inves-





and endorsed by an
FAA designated
Examiner/Check Air-
man or other agent
acting for the FAA.
and
(b) recision of airman
certificate privileges
for a period equal to
one half (or less) of
that which is stipula-
ted in FAA Order
2150.3A, Appendix 4
(4) the airman's certificate
would be deposited in the
local FSDO under the
supervision of the investi-
gating Inspector
(5) upon completion of the
reeducation and recision
period. the certificate
would be retumed to the
airman
(6) and. importantly. that no
finding of violation would
be made
(7) record in the FAA Enforce-
ment Information Sub-
system (EIS) data base
would show administrative
action only.
In order for an airman to qualify
for the proposed AROP program.
the violation would have to meet
the following criteria:
(1) a lack of competency was
not involved. and
(2) the violation was not
deliberate. and
(3) the alleged violator had a
constructive attitude
toward complying with the
regulations. and
(4) the alleged violator has
not been involved in
similar violations.
The specific elements listed
above are almost identical to
those which currently exist with
regard to the imposition of
normal administrative action
(rille 14. 1988. Part 13.11) The
elements not present in the
AROP program which are listed
in the normal administrative
action program are that: (a) no
significant unsafe condition
existed. and (b) lack of qualifi-
cation was not a factor. As
previously discussed. the result-
ing and unplanned existence of
a significant unsafe condition is
separate and totally disassocia-
ted from any underlying causal
element. By excluding an airman
from the AROP program because
an unsafe condition (which the
airman did not anticipate nor
JAAER, Spring 1992
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have control over) resulted from
under-informed action, then
clearly the airman's fundamental
shortcoming would not be
addressed. Further, if lack of
qualification is an element from
which categorical exclusion from
the AROP program would result,
it would fail to address the
precipitating causal factor
inherent in the violation. Instead,
this exclusionary element, man-
datory in normal administrative
action, provides the impetus for
certificate action (punishment)
solely in response to an airman's
qualification, such as an expired
medical certificate.
In order for AROP program to
be deemed viable, its primary
benefit over the existing
programs must be greater. It is
suggested that there are three
basic enhancements embodied
within its structure which act to
separate it from and make it
superior to other enforcement
tools. First, there would be a
balance between a retributive
and restitutive sanction in
consideration of potential tension
bebNeen cause and efted.
Second, there would result a
significant reduction in resource
expenditure necessary to effec-
tively deal with the subject
category of (under-informed)
violator. Third, there would be a
relatively short time between
commission of the violation and
the effectuation of a remedy.
SERIES SUMMARY
This series has examined the
FAA's statutory authority with
regard to pilot sanctions, and the
FAA's compliance and enforce-
ment program. It was established
that there exists a conflict
JAAER, Spring 1992
between the FAA's stated
enforcement policy objectives
and the effectiveness of the
actual program. Ultimately, to
reconcile the conflicts, a
proposal was presented for an
altemative enforcement tool,
AROP program. to be infused
into the existing program.
Currently, the primary effect of
the FAA's compliance and en-
forcement policy is retributive in
nature. That is, it is based upon
punishment to the offender.
Retribution, and the deterrent
effects thereof, seemingly, are
intrinsic to any enforcement
process, and are not necessarily
undesirable.
For example, many of the
enforcement actions undertaken
by the FAA are the result of an
airman's negligent and willful
disregard for the rules and
regUlations. As SUCh, any future
deterrence to intentional non-
compliance gained through an
appropriate retributive sanction
(e.g., suspension of an airman's
certificate) advances the overall
safety objectives of the FAA in
the public interest.
In many circumstances the
FAA's enforcement program fails
to subjectively consider the
underlying cause of infractions
committed by those who are
predisposed toward voluntary
compliance, but violate the rules
nevertheless. This failure is
demonstrated by the retributive
nature of the sanctions imposed.
These airmen operate outside
the FAA's ·clear awareness and
understanding· standard and
should, therefore, be subjected
to a restitutive sanction, effec-
tively balanced with an appro-
priate level of retribution. This
type of adion would facilitate a
rehabilitative approach and
should be coexistent with the
need for future deterrence.
In order to meet the FAA's
stated goals and objectives with
respect to the under-informed
select category of violator, an
alternative enforcement tool must
be infused into the current
process, and a balance between
retributive deterrence and resti-
tutive reeducation would provide
the framework for a more effica-
cious solution to certain inci-
dents of non-compliance. The
proposed Administrative Reci-
sion of Privileges program would
provide an alternative process
and a shift in the contemporary
retributive policy to a more
restitutive form.
Ultimately, this newtool, AROP,
could maximize limited resour-
ces, address the cause and not
just the effects of the violation,
and meet the demands of expe-
diency. These benefits would
provide the system with informed
compliance and an airman
predisposed to work within the
regulatory mechanism instead of
avoiding it (through uninformed
deterrence).
In sum, the national airspace
system and its associated tech-
nology are rapidly evolving and
becoming vastly more complex.
This evolutionary process
requires an increased level of
aeronautical skill and knowledge
in order to achieve the high
degree of safety necessary in the
public interest. Unquestionably,
this fact illustrates the need for a
critical assessment and positive
shift in the FAA's current compli-
27
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ance and enforcement program.
The clear awareness and
understanding standard
espoused by the FAA (FAA,
1988a, p. 11) must be consider-
ed in the face of the changing
technological environment.
Without an elevated level of
competency precipitatedthrough
informed compliance, system
integrity is unavoidably reduced.
The informed compliance
standard is the essential goal of
the AROP program.
AROP IN REVIEW
The preceding overview of the
proposed AROP program seeks
to define the various issues
relevant in FAA enforcement
policy and philosophy. The
current enforcement program
effectively addresses a
significant portion of airman
violations with due consideration
of the involved cause and effect
circumstances. There is, how-
ever, an equally important
segment of airmen subjected to
enforcement who, seemingly, do
not receive an appropriate
response from the FAA subse-
quent to certain incidents
deemed to be in n~n-compliance
with the FARs. The solution to
this dichotomy is manifest within
the AROP proposal.
The AROP program identifies
those airmen who meet specified
conditions within a category
where there is ignorance or a
lack of awareness. The airman
meeting the criteria for inclusion
into the AROP program is not
considered to be incompetent,
nor no longer satisfying the
minimum standards attendant to
the certificate involved. There is
currently an existing procedure
28
embodied within the authority of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
(Act, Sec. 609) wherein this
degree of inability is dealt with.
Specifically, whenever the FAA
has reason to believe that a
certificate-holding airman may
not be qualified to hold a certain
certificate or rating, he/she can
be required to undergo a
reexamination (FAA, 1988a, p.
101).
The type of airman targeted for
the AROP program (subsequent
to a violation) would meet the
minimum standards of his/her
certificate. Given the minimum
standards that are currently
required for certification, in
addition to the nature of an
extremely complex aviation
structure, the occurrence of
violations precipitated by under-
informed activity would seem'
inevitable. Setting the foundation
for enforcement decisions upon
a standard of performance
expected in any operational
situation or environment belies
the reality of a many faceted
system.
In 1987, 850 pilot deviations
were discovered in the FAA's
Western-Pacific Region. Of this
number, 593 resulted in enforce-
ment action. Further, 300 pilot
deviations involved TCA incur-
sions. A review of the airspace in
and around the Los Angeles
area, for example, would reveal
that operation in this environ-
ment is demanding for even the
most skilled aviator. The multi-
tude of complex airspace struc-
tures, difficult to see navigation
points, and an air traffic control
system necessarily rife with
non-standard site-specific
procedural requirements,
obviously exceeds the know-
ledge levels of many aviators.
This circumstance is poignantly
illustrated through the FAA's
enforcement program.
Retributive sanctions imposed
for deterrence purposes, as a
result of certain violations of
FARs, should not be the extent
of the FAA's involvement. After
all, the FAA's technical name for
its program is Compliance and
Enforcement. Restitution by
reeducation and awareness
training should be mandated
when appropriate. The AROP
program offers this balance.
The inexperienced airman is
not the exclusive target of the
AROP program. Even the most
proficient and professional
operator is subjected to the
vicissitudes of the complex
operating environment. In spite
of the precept of system wide
standardization and of clear,
concise regulations, an inherent
subjectivity is interwoven into
every element of day-ta-day
operation. The FAA's oversight
mechanism, nevertheless, is
designed to construe each non-
compliant act as a breach of a
rule or regulation that should
have been followed. There is, as
previously noted, an opportunity
for mitigating (and aggravating)
circumstances to be addressed
following a violation. However,
any finding in this area is limited
to a modification of the'sanction
and not justification for occur-
renee of the violation.
A navigation error or deviation
from an altitude clearance might
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This restitutive reeducation
would be coexistent with a retri-
butive deterrent in the form of
privilege recision as indicated in
the AROP program. The goals
and objectives of the FAA's
enforcement policywould be met
with added emphasis on future
compliance and not just deter-
rence. Clearly, informed compli-
ance with a regulation is not the
same as deterrence from
committing a future violation of
the same regulation.
With an FAA Designated exam-
iner or other representative of
the FAA oversee the chosen re-
education of the violator, an
acceptable degree of control
could be maintained. If ground
instruction was the type of train-
ing decided upon, the examiner
would be paid the prevailing rate
by the violator. Awareness train-
ing, such as spending time at an
air traffic control facility or
attending FAA sponsored safety
seminars, could easily be vali-
dated and not involve a direct
expense.
Rescinding pilot privileges,
rather than suspending a partic-
ular certificate, acts as a deter-
rent to the violator in much the
same manner. The primary differ-
ences are a reduced length of
time, an almost immediate
implementation of sanction, and
no finding of violation. By
utilizing one-half or less of the
time stipulated within FAA
guidelines (FAA, 19888, Appen-
dix 4), the period without pilot
privileges is much more
palatable to the under-informed
violator.
Inherent within the wording of
Section 609 of the Aviation Act is
JAAER, Spring 1992
the assumption that a mandatory
legal process must ensue prior
to depriving an airman of his/her
certificate. The AROP program is
not an argument with the legality
of certificate suspension, to the
contrary, it is a process desig-
ned to embrace a current pro-
cedure of rescinding privileges
under specified conditions.
Specifically, the FAA now allows
an airman to deposit his/her
certificate with the district office
pending reexamination (under
Sec. 609 of the Act). Under the
existing policy an airman may
voluntarily give up pilot privi-
leges, or portion thereof, while
preparing for the reexamination.
This current procedure allows for
up to 60 days (possibly more
under some conditions) of certifi-
cate deposit time within the local
FSDO (FAA, 1978, p. 5). This
concept ostensibly allows an air-
man whose competence is being
questioned to delay the reexam-
ination for a period of time
necessary for some type of
(re)training. The acceptance of
this procedure by the airman
allows for delay of the
reexamination process (or
another attempt at it), in lieu of
the FAA taking enforcement
action to suspend the involved
certificate for lack of qualification
(competence).
The process just described is
specifically prohibited from being
used to resolve a violation ~AA,
1978, p. 5 [b]). It is suggested
that the AROP program could
utilize the fundamental concept
incorporated in the reexamina-
tion program, which amounts to
an administrative recision of
privileges. This action, in concert
with the other elements of the
AROP program, allows for an
effective resolution for certain
violations.
Equally as important in the
AROP program, as opposed to
the current legal enforcement
process, is that the FAA would
not make a finding of violation.
Just as in the current administra-
tive program, this amounts to a
compromised concession in
favor of some level of restitution.
The proposed AROP program,
cate ori ally, would be an admin-
is rative action and would be
voluntary when offered by the
investigating field office. It would
be offered when deemed appro-
priate in lieu of legal enforcement
action. If the alleged violator
desired, this person would
always have the opportunity for
the due process available
through the legal enforcement
procedure. The foundation of the
AROP program, however, is a
mutual agreement between the
Investigating Inspector and the
airman that there had been a
technical violation. If the alleged
violator elected to dispute the
circumstances and not accept
AROP, then legal enforcement
would be the only altemative.
AROP offers an effective,
timely, and less expensive altern-
ative for those violations not
appropriate for the current
administrative or legal enforce-
ment programs. The exact
numbers and categories of
violations which would ultimately
meet the criteria for AROP is
unclear. Certainly, a significant
portion of the large system-wide
volume of pilot deviations would
be likely candidates. The under-
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lying theme being developed,
however. is a conceptual shift to
emphasis on compliance, in
advance of and in preference to,
the limited enforcement tools
currently available. An informed
and compliant airman who has
not been tumed against the sys-
tern because of an unpalatable
level of retribution becomes a
cooperative and future element
of safety.•
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